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Participation in Plato*s Dialogues: 
Phaedo. Parmenides» Sophist and Timaeus
Lee Sweeney» S. J. 
Loyola 0niversify of Chicago
From the time of its first technical use by Plato* "partici­
pation" has recurred in every period of the history of Western 
thought· One; can gather that fact simply from checking a bibli­
ography on participation- The one I consulted consists of 81 en­
tries and is five typed pages in length. Eesides eight general 
studies on participation— regarding its nature and history— and 
one on scholasticism in general— it lists studies on the follow­
ing individual philosophers: Plato (eight studies)* Aristotle,
Plotinus (d. 270 A.D.), Augustine (d. 430 A.O.), Proel us (d.
485), Psuedo-Dionysius the Areopagite (fl. 485-533) , Boethius (d. 
523), Bcnaventure (d. 1274), Thomas Aguinas (d. 1274; thirty- 
three studies), Henry of Ghent (d. after 1292), Malebranche, 
Blondel, Louis La veile (five studies^, Husserl and other phenome- 
nologists, Gabriel Marcel.
Yet despite its frequent recurrence in the history of ideas 
it is no easy matter to determine and understand what participa­
tion genuinely means, if I may judge by myself. In 1965— after 
studying philosophy for twenty-five years, and teaching it for 
ten— I published a book of 365 pages entitled A Metaphysics of 
Authentic Existentialism, in which I deliberately did not mention 
the word "participation" even once, even though the book often 
touched on problems which other authors had solved by introducing 
the notion of participation. But beginning with 1965 I decided I 
had to come to grips with participation by at least trying to un­
derstand what other authors meant by it and, hence, I started a 
yearly series of seminars on the topic in Greek authors (espe­
cially Plato) and in medieval authors, which has issued into this 
present paper. It will concentrate'on Plato's conception of me- 
thexis in the Phaedo, Parmenides, Sophist and Tiroaeus. Let me 
share with you my interpretation of those four .dialogues (one 
must remember, though, that Plato also uses the notion and the 
word in his Symposium, Republic and philebus) and profit from 
your questions and suggestions. ~
But before the paper itself, let me make two comments on 
terminology. The English word "participation" is more directly 
not a translation of the Greek noun methexig, derived from the 
verb metechein, but a translaticn/transliteraticn of the Latin
* >
noun "participatio," derived fron "participare,” which connotes 
«partea capere" or "to take a part," an expression which in phil­
osophical contexts can be very misleading. The Greek verb aete- 
chein (and its derivatives) does not have that aisleading conno­
tation, since neta with the genitive Beans: in the midst of,
among, in coaaon with, along with. The verb aetechein would, 
then, aean: to have along with, to have in coaaon with, (by in­
ference) to be dependent cn, to be in relationship with. Thus, 
the noun aethexis indicates a state of having in common with, of 
dependence upon, of being related to. (The verb aetalambanein is 
sometimes used as a synonym for aetechein and differs mainly by 
suggesting an ongoing process: to come to have along with, etc.)1
Secondly, he aitia and to aition in technical contexts I 
take to mean "cause" iñ the sense of~"that which produces some­
thing in some sort of direct way." That producer can be an agent 
(= efficient cause), that which directs his artistic activity 
(= exemplary cause), his goal ( = telic or final cause), the in­
gredients or components which make up tne effect (= intrinsic 
causes— "intrinsic" as constitutive parts ys. agent, model and 
goal, which are other than the effect and, hence, its "extrinsic" 
causes).2
This interpretation of aitia and aitien is in oppostion to 
that of Gregory Vlastos, "Heascns and Causes in the Phaedo." Pla- 
tonic Studies (Princeton: University Press, 1973), pp. 76-110,
for whom aitia in Phaedo. 10QB sgq., does cot mean "cause," which 
in ordinary speech points to the temporal antecedent that is the 
sufficient condition of an event and thus allows the event to be 
predicted (ibid.. p. 79) and which is restriced to agency, to ef­
ficacy. Shat, then, is an aitia? It is at once logical and me­
taphysical. It has to do with logical explanation and classifi­
cation of realities and points to their metaphysical necessity. 
For instance, in the sentence "This figure on the blackboard is a 
sguare because it has four equal sides and four egual angles," 
the clause beginning with because explains not the occurrence it­
self of sguare-shaped chalkaarks on the blackboard but the es­
sence of squareness in those marks, the logical conditions for 
their being square (PS, pp. 90-91). And the reason why we can 
"speak significantly and truly of things being square" is "that 
there exists an incorporeal, immutable, intelligible object named 
•Squareness,’ which is the metaphysical foundation of our logical 
explanation" (ibid., pp. 91-92). T^ ius, an aitia is the logical 
function of a metaphysical entity (ibid., p. 92).
But has an aitia no link with causality? Although no aitia 
is a cause, those involved in physical situations (e.g., "Jones 
is sick because he has a fever," "A burning log is hot because it 
is on fire," "The white stuff on the ground is cold because it is 
snow") do have causal implications. Thus, "when Socrates main­
tains that the Form, Snow, is the aitia of cold," what he asserts 
is "firmly tied to the causal structure of the world, e.g., to 
the fact that if we raise the temperature beyond a certain point
2
snow Bust change to water. This ’must* is a causal one. And 
since in Plato’s theory it is grounded in relations of entailment 
between Foras, it would have to be a fantastically strong ’must*: 
it would have to express a physical law that has logical necessi­
ty" (ibid.. pp. 10U-105) . This causal implication in an aitia 
discloses that nature exhibits rational necessity because its 
laws mirror the interrelations of the Forms explored in logico- 
matheaatical reasoning (ibid., p. 107).
Vlastos' provocative and eloguent interpretation deserves 
serious and detailed consideration, which however must be post­
poned to another occasion. Let me state for now that I do not 
find it entirely convincing. ’'Cause" need be defined as "a tem­
poral antecedent which is the . . .  sufficient condition of the 
occurrence of an event" (p. 79) only if one accepts Hume’s inter­
pretation of cause as that which is temporally prior to the ef­
fect. Escaping his influence, Plato is much more likely to have 
conceived of efficient cause as temporally simultaneous and spa­
tially contiguous to the event it causes (by reflecting, for ex­
ample, upon the fact that any paragraph in the Phaedo itself was 
effected only by his actually applying a stylus to the wax sur­
face and thereby writing: the application and the appearance of
the Greek characters in meaningful sequence were simultaneous).
By reflection upon other concrete causes (e.g., Phidias chisels a 
block of marble into a statue of Athena so as to gain the god­
dess’ good will, the marble and resultant shape make up the stat­
ue) he could very well have, in fact, extended the notion of 
"cause" until it was applicable to the other factors directly 
helping to produce something: the goal (the good-as-known) moti­
vating the agent, the exemplar directing his activity, the ingre­
dients which directly constitute the end-product.
From everyday experience, then, he could have realized that 
a cause is that which produces something, whether by activity 
(efficient cause) , by motivating the agent in his efficiency (fi­
nal cause), by directing his activity (exemplary cause), by being 
present within the product as constituents (intrinsic causes) .
As the Timaeus makes clear (see h6B sqg., for example), Pla­
to' s actual position is a bit more complicated. Forms serving as 
goals and models, plus the intelligent agent they influence, are 
"authentic" causes, whereas fire, air, water and earth, as ele­
ments and in their various compounds also, are "accessory" causes 
(svnaitial used by the craftsman in fashioning individual things 
and the physical universe (see also Phaedo. 9 9B: physical stuffs
are "that without which an authentic cause would not be a 
cause"). The receptacle itself, wherein that fashioning takes 
place, is an "errant cause" (h8A: tes planomenes aitias) in that
universe (see below, n. 15).
But, more generally, one may validly infer from Plato’s 
texts and from our (and his) experience in everyday life, that 
"cause" (aitia, to aition) means "that which produces something
1
in some sort of direct way·" That is, I submit, the notion of 
"cause" which Plato had in mind when describing the Porm of Beau­
ty as the aitia which makes things beautiful by its presence 
somehow within them: it is that which produces their beauty.
Accordingly, the aitiai mentioned in Phaedo. 100B sqq·, are genu­
ine causes.
Let us turn, then, to the Phaedo. in which Plato first 
speaks of methexis. Individual things are caused to be what they 
are (e.g., beautiful, just, tall) by the presence (parousia) in 
them of the Forms of Beauty, Justice, Tallness and by their hav­
ing beauty, justice and tallness somehow in common (koinonia) 
with such Forms. These latter make individuals be beautiful, 
just and tall (Phaedo. 100D sgq.) .3 But how can the single Form 
of (say) Beauty be in multiple beautiful existents? How can such 
a Form have something in common with them? The closest Plato 
comes to replying to such inquiries is his distinction of three 
factors in a participational situation: the Form itself (e.g.,
Beauty), which is unique and separate from things; the partici­
pated perfection (beauty), which must be as multiple as the indi­
vidual beautiful things;4 and the participant, which is the indi­
vidual rose or person or race horse and which receives the parti­
cipated perfection and is thereby caused to be beautiful 
(102B-D). Father obviously, the second factor is crucial if the 
Form is itself to remain transcendent and yet be the immanent 
source of perfection in multiple participants. The participated 
perfection alone inheres directly in each participant and yet is 
the medium through which the Form makes the many individuals par­
ticipating it be what they are. The integrity and causality of 
the Form are both preserved,5 and the original problem of how a 
single Form can be in multiple participations and have something 
in common with them is solved.
But a new question arises now and it concerns the multiple 
participations, which are distinct from Form and from partici­
pants. What produces them? the Form itself? by itself or with 
some other cause?
We look in vain for a discussion of those issues in the 
Phaedo but are more successful in the Parmenides. While studying 
objections against the existence and nature of the Forms, Plato 
speaks through Parmenides to explicate the problem already met in 
the Phaedo: participation in a single Form by multiple partici­
pants appears impossible since the Form would then be present in 
each thing either entirely or partially, and neither alternative 
is acceptable (Farm.. 131 A-D).5 But a couple of pages later he 
returns to participation with another statement (through Socrates 
this time) :
Let Forms be patterns in nature and let things resemble
them and be their likeness. In fact, let participation
of things in a Form be itself nothing else than their
being-made-as-images of Forms--132D1 -<4: τ ά μ \ ν tilifravra*
-  '4 -
: ωσ-(ρ ταραΐίϊγματα Ιστάναι Ιν τρ φνσα, τα ¿<t άλλα TOvroit fioiKtvat κα\ ftva i_ομοιώματα}* 
IS καί η μ ίβ ιζιΓ αντί} rots ÄAXoir γ[γν(σθαι των tlûtcv ονκ άλλη rií'¡ η (ίκασβηνατ avroîs·
The aorist passive infinite in line four (eikasthenai) reveals 
what Plato has in mind.7 Things are not merely like~the Porn: 
they are made to be like it, they are caused to be images of it. 
And this causality arises necessarily from two sources, one of 
which is the Form (already disclosed in the Phaedo) , the Other an 
agent working not through his natural but mental powers. This 
intelligent agent brings things about by his activity and thus is 
an efficient cause. The Porm directs that activity and thus is 
an exemplary cause.
In positing this double sort of causality Plato is replying 
to the question of how participated perfections originate. The 
Form produces them exemplarily by directing the artistic activity 
of the intelligent agent, who also produces the« efficiently in 
the participants. Since an intellectual agent can (all things 
being equal) engage repeatedly in artistic activity, which the 
Form can constantly direct as pattern, agent and Form can be the 
source of many participated perfectons. These last are other 
than both sources. They make the participants be what they are 
(e. g., beautiful, just, tall). They are that by which the Form 
is present in its participants. They are that which the Form has 
in common with the participants. They are that by which these 
latter are like one another and the Form. And in its paradigmat­
ic direction the Form is neither divided nor changed nor less­
ened. Beauty (for example) remains completely what it is and yet 
it is shared in wholly by many participants through the partici­
pations of beauty, which are as many as are the participants 
worked upon by the agent and exemplarily influenced by the Form.
In our reading of the Parmenides, then, the issue of how 
participated perfections originate has been successfully met by 
Plato*s joining efficient causality to exemplarity.
In the Sophist he attends to each of those causalities even 
more diligently and in greater detail. If an agent working 
through knowledge is as essential to participation as a Form 
functioning as model, then intelligence must be explicitly raised 
to as high a level of reality as the Forms occupy. This eleva­
tion Plato achieves at the end of the battle he stages 
(2U6A-2h8E) between the Giants and1 Gods (=Friends of the Forms) 
on what ousia itself is.* There he puts intellect and intellec­
tion on a par with Forms through a sudden and emotional exclama­
tion.
For heaven’s sake! surely we won’t let ourselves be so 
easily convinced that change, life, soul, understanding 
are not present in what is really real (to pantelgs 
onti)— that it has neither life nor thought but, awe­
some and holy, it stands immutable and devoid of intel­
ligence. And if it has intelligence, it cannot be
S
without life; if with intelligence and life, it must 
possess them in a soul; if it has intelligence, life 
and soul, it can hardly be completely immutable and yet 
ensouled. Hence, one must admit that what changes and 
change itself are beings (2ïl8E-2h9B).
Because intelligence is so obviously worthwhile (see 2*»9C 10), it 
must be really real, and the factors which it entails (soul, 
life, kinesis) must also be equally real. Hith this conclusion 
Plato by implication puts high value on the efficient causality 
stemming from a cognitive agent qua cognitive and, thus, consid­
ers him a worthy partner of Forms in achieving participation of 
things in Forms. Accordingly, we do not depart from his authen­
tic thought if we take the final sentence in his validation of 
intelligence (2h9D3-h: a philosopher "oust say that being and
its sum total [to on kai to pan 1 are at once both whatever is 
changeless [the Forms] and whatever changes [intelligence]") to 
mean also; a philosopher must hold that the sum-total of reality 
embraces as causal forces both exemplarity and efficiency.
Furthermore, when he is discussing in the Sophist productive 
art (219B sqg.) and divine and human artists (26hD-266D), he also 
furnishes data from which one may more clearly understand exemp­
larity.
To begin with, then, what is a productive art (poietike 
techne)? An art is the ability a cognitive existent employs when 
acting precisely as cognitive. It is productive if he is acting 
thus in order to produce rather than to acquire something. To 
produce is to bring something into being which previously was not 
(219Bh-6). Although no mention is made of the producer’s contem­
plating a design or model, such contemplation is surely presup­
posed. He produces through his knowledge of what is to be made, 
which accordingly serves as an exemplar to direct his activity. 
His product is exactly what has been made through that awareness, 
the objective content of which it accordingly participates in. 
Productive art, then, suggests and even requires participation.
Such art is (Plato resumes after a long digression) poss­
essed by both god and men (see 266A8 sqg.). These latter employ 
it to cause an artifact such as a house by putting together wood, 
stones and other suitable materials furnished by divine crafts­
manship; God, the master artist, uhes his productive art to cause 
the stuff human artists utilize for their artifacts but also even 
the artists themselves, as well as "all mortal animals and all 
things that grow--whether these be plants that grow above the 
earth from seeds and roots or all the inanimate bodies, fusible 
or infusible, formed within the earth" (265C1-3).
Absolutely every existent in our All is, then, a divine ar­
tifact. Hone of them "has come into being (as is commonly be­
lieved and expressed) from nature giving birth to them as the re­
sult of some spontaneous cause that generates without intelli-
6
gence" (265C7-8). No, "what before was not comes now into being 
through divine craftsmanship and nothing else·"» They come "from 
a cause which, working with reason and knowledge, is divine" 
(265C3-5 and 8-9). Hence, each of them had resulted from god’s 
working through knowledge of what was to be made, which accord­
ingly served as a pattern. Thus each of them has been made to be 
a likeness of and, thereby, participates in that pattern. There­
fore participation everywhere permeates the divine artifact which 
is the entire visible universe, no less than it does the houses, 
beds and other products of human ingenuity within it.
CONCLUSIONS
Having witnessed Plato's upgrading intelligence (and there­
upon the efficient causality it exercises) and his disclosing the 
extent and nature of divine artistry, let us now, before moving 
to the Timaeus. bring the Sophist into focus with the Phaedo and 
Parmenides. This we shall do first by momentarily putting aside 
Plato's dialogues altogether so as to consider some cause-effect 
situations which occur in everyday life, whether it be in America 
of the twentieth century or in Greece of the fourth century B. C.
A man and a woman, let us suppose, have begotten a newborn 
daughter. They have acted naturally— that is, through their 
biological powers of reproduction. The effect (the daughter) is 
the same sort of being as is the cause (the parents): both are
human existents. In nature and essential properties the effect 
is equal to the casues. This sort of efficient causality let us 
call (in anticipation of the next case) "univocal."
Some years later the mother paints a portrait of the child. 
The mother is now acting not biologically but through cognition: 
taking the child as model, she translates what she sees in flesh 
and blood into variously colored pigments spread upon canvas.
The effect (the protrait of the daugther) is si mi liar to the 
cause (the daughter as model): it is, after all, a portrait of
the child. But there is also dissimilarity insofar as the effect 
(the child-as-painted-upon-flat-porous-surface) is not identical­
ly the same sort as the cause (the living child herself as exemp­
lar). The effect is unequal to the cause; the portrait is of 
less value than the daughter herself. This kind of efficient 
cause (an agent working through knowledge, through art) let us 
term "analogous."*o
One should note carefully what this last causal situation 
involves. The activity of the cognitive agent (the mother as 
artist) under the directive influence of the model (the child 
posing before her) has produced in the effect (the protrait) a 
perfection (the child represented in pigments on canvas) which 
makes it like the exemplary cause, which it has in common with 
the exemplar, which enables the exemplar to be present to it but
7
which is less than the perfection as found in the exemplar.
These factors make analogous causality distinctive and unique.
It is to express and stress this uniqueness that the term "par­
ticipation" is applied to it. Such an effect participates in the 
exemplary cause. It is its participant.11
Before turning again to Plato's texts, let us add a couple 
more comments. Although participation directly explicates the 
relationship a product has to its exemplary cause, it also in­
volves efficient cause. A cognitive agent is the channel through 
which a model influences the effect„12 To use again our previous 
illustration: even though the model (the child) directs and thus
exemplarily causes the activity of painting, the mother herself 
efficiently produces it. In fact, her activity is the very para­
digmatic direction itself.»3
Secondly, God efficiently causes all material existents 
through knowledge and thus he is their analogous cause and they 
are his artifacts. They are similiar -to him insofar as both they 
and he exist; they are dissimiliar inasmuch as they exist in a 
limited way (they have existence) but he in an unrestricted way 
(he is existence) . No creature measures up to the divine perfec­
tions: each is less than God. Accordingly, each participates in
' God, and participation permeates the entire created universe.19
Such is the Weltanschauung which can disclose itself to any­
one observing natural and cognitive agents at work in everyday 
life. In it awareness of efficient and exemplary causality pre­
cedes that of participation.
In initially formulating his philosophical theories, how­
ever, Plato did not walk that path. Of course he knew from expe­
rience that sexual· intercourse can lead to pregnancy, that an an­
imal's eating and digesting food brings about its growth, that 
the bones and sinews in his body help explain how he is sitting 
or standing or walking (Phaedo. 98C-E). But in that sane dia­
logue such activity was not significant: physical agents were
not genuine causes.15 Moreover, gods were not a first principle 
in his philosophy, however often he might mention them.1*
What was of primal importance to him was formal causality. 
From his experiencing that many existents are (say) beautiful,17 
he realized that there is a Form or Essence of Beauty.18 And this 
causes the beauty in things by its presence somehow in them. The 
Form of Beauty is steadfast and perfect, whereas beauty in things 
is inconstant and imperfect. let beauty is what the Form and 
things somehow have in common (koinonia). To express this situ­
ation Plato spoke of things as participating in the Form causing 
them to be what they are by its presence. Such is his initial 
insight into participation in the Phaedo. The Forms are extrin­
sic formal causes of what sensible existents are by being present 
in and associated with them. These last share in the Forms 
through the participated perfections they receive. Formal cau­
sality and participation are two sides of the same coin.19 8
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But gradually Plato came to realize that his view of parti­
cipation was incomplete. In order to succeed, the three-factor 
theory of the Phaedo (the Form itself, the participated perfec­
tions, participants) needed further causes to explain how the 
participated perfections themselves were produced in the partici­
pants without the Form itself being changed, multiplied, divided. 
His answer can be found in the Parmenides and Sophist, where he 
joined participation explicitly with exemplarity and efficiency. 
More adequately, then, participation consists in things being- 
made-as-images of the Forms (Para.. 132D3-4), which thereby are 
present in their participants through the participated perfec­
tions they cause by paradigmatically directing the artistic ac­
tivity of cognitive agents (Sophist. 248E sqg. and 264 sgq.).
The advantages of this more adeguate conception are obvious. 
By their activity agents are genuine causes that sensible exis­
tente are what they are. By their indirect presence through par­
ticipated perfections the Forms are genuine causes of what things 
are. Yet they are not divided or multiplied or changed or less­
ened by their causality. Simply by being what it is, a Form can 
constantly direct as model whatever artistic activity the cogni­
tive agent wishes to engage in. Sensible existents themselves 
are actually produced and yet they remain imperfect: they are
> only images of the Forms, upon which they depend constantly for 
being what they are.
Plato*s procedure in formulating his philosophy was, then, 
to start with participation and end with efficient and exemplary 
causalities. But these latter do not replace the former: they
complement and enrich it. à thing's participation in Forms re­
sults from the divine agent producing it while acting under their 
paradigmatic guidance.
TIHABOS
Finally, we come to the Timaeus. This dialogue shows itself 
tó have preserved the theory of participation inherited from the 
other dialogues in all its salient points: things are made by
the divine craftsman to be images (and thus participations) of 
Forms serving as models (28B sqg.).. Eut it has increased that 
inheritance by adding many new insights. For example, fire, air, 
water and earth are caused to be like theii homonymous Forms by 
god's fashioning them, under paradigmatic direction of the Forms, 
from right-angled scalene and isosceles triangles into the four 
bafeic geometrical solids (53C-55C),20 all cf which come and go so 
constantly in space that none of them is a tode but only a toiou- 
ton (48D7-E7) .2 1
But Plato is not content with speaking of things only in 
themselves, each made to resemble its own complexus of Forms: he
also exposes how the divine artist constructs from them the visi- 9
9
ble universe as an exact image (and, hence, participation) of the 
Form of the Living Being, which embraces the Forms of all other 
living Beings as its parts. The result is that the visible &11, 
which contains "ourselves and all other living existents" (30C) , 
is "supremely good and beautiful and perfect" (see 92CU-9). I 
should think so! The god who crafted it is himself good and to­
tally without envy and, therefore, desired that "everything 
should be good and, so far as it might be, nothing be imperfect" 
(29E-30A). The Form of the Living Being, which served as goal to 
initiate his activity and as model to direct it, is "that intel­
ligible reality which is best and in every possible way complete" 
(30D). The very fact that our All shares in such an all-perfect 
Form through the mediation of such an all-loving agent and father 
(28C3 and 29E1 sqg. ) guarantees a maximal degree of goodness and 
beauty for it as a whole and for each of its constitutive parts.
The setting up of that All is an interesting accomplishment 
in itself and is also informative on participation since in the 
Timaeus Plato speaks in some detail and for the first time of 
what functions as the basic participant throughout the physical 
universe: the receptacle.22 In Phaedo. 102B-D, and Parmenides.
1308, he had used a proper name (Simias) or a personal pronoun 
(we) to refer to a participant and had done little more to ex­
plain it then to Contrast it both with the Form (e.g., Tallness, 
Likeness) and the participated perfection (tallness, likeness). 
But in the Ti maeus he spends considerable time on it under the 
guise of receptacle (hypodochê).23
It is the physis which receives fire and the other bodies 
(50B6) . It is the space (52AU) through which they constantly 
pass in and out of the eternal and intelligible beings (50Ct»-5) . 
It is their mother (50D2-3) and nurse (i»9A6). It is the impres­
sionable stuff (ekmaqeion) from which they are all molded and 
which is thus made to appear different at different times, al­
though it never departs from its own character but always retains 
its own name and nature as the sole permanent and determinate be­
ing (tode) in the physical universe. In order to receive earth, 
water and the rest, as well as their compounds, it must itself be 
non-earthen, non-aquaceous, etc. (t»9E7-5lB6). Its reality or 
function is, then, to be a receptacle— the participant of partic­
ipated perfections (images) of Forms through the artistry of god 
fashioning the visible All. „
But it still has a further mark which colors its participa- 
tional role: it is necessity (anante) . It is, if left to it­
self, the errant cause (tSs planômenês aitias) from which natu- 
râlly issues disorderly motion (47E-U8A) . Existent before the 
god constructed the cosmos from it and the Forms, it transferred 
that chaotic motion to the traces (ichne) and dynaméis within it 
of fire, air, water and earth, which also pre-existed in the 
chaos, which erratically rocked the receptacle in turn and which 
were without any proportion and measure in their masses and mo­
tions save by chance (35A and 69B). The task of the divine art-
10
ist was twofold: to make fire and so forth be genuine images
(and thus participations) of the Foras of Fire etc. ** and, sec­
ondly, suitably to proportion and arrange their volume, aoweaent 
and other qualities so as to fora a cosmos which would reseable 
as closely as possible (and thus participate in) the goodness and 
beauty of the Foras serving as goals and models (53BÖ-C1 and 
69B2-C3). 85
As presented by Plato in the Tinaeus, the divine workaan did 
complete that task: he achieved "this world with a full comple­
ment of living existente, aortal and iaaortal— a visible living 
All, an image of the intelligible, a perceptible god, supreme in 
greatness and excellence, in beauty and perfection" (see 92C).
Yet one must not underestimate its difficulty since he had to 
cope with the receptacle: a recalcitrant and errant factor func­
tioning nonetheless as the omni-present participant of the tran­
scendent Forms.
Finally, here in capsule is the information on participation 
from the four dialogues studied. (a) Phaedo explains how things 
are caused to be what they are by their participation in Forms 
present in and associated with them through multiple participated 
perfections. (b) The Parmenides discloses how those multiple 
participations arise by Plato^s"*adding efficient causality to ex- 
emplarity. (c) The Sophist deals with the participation of 
things in Forms by attributing as much genuine reality to intel­
ligence as ascribed to Forms and, then, by illuminating exemplar- 
ity through divine and human artistry. (d) In the Tiaaeus Foras 
function not only as models (individual things are images through 
participation) but also as goals (they are made to constitute a 
visible universe which is supremely good and beautiful), even 
though the basic participant in our world is the hypodoche or 
chora, through which fire and other bodies constantly pass as im­
ages but which also affects them with its own disorderly motion.
The bibliography on participation which I mentioned in the first 
paragraph of this paper was drawn up by William J. Carroll, Profes­
sor of Philosophy, Coppin State College, in connection with his¿ 
dissertation, "Participation in Selected Texts of Pseudo-Dionysius 
the Areopagite’s The Divine Names"*(Washington. D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America, 1981), pp. 184-95.
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FOOTNOTES
1 See F. B. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides (Hew York: Liberal
Arts Press, 1957), p. 69, n.”l. *”
2 Plato hesitates to call ingredients or constituents authentic 
causes but terms then "that without which a genuine cause would 
not be a cause," "necessary conditions" or "accessory causes."
For references see below, n. 15. Aristotle experiences no such 
hesitation and calls them "material and formal causes."
For further information on "cause" as "that which produces 
something in some sort of direct fashion," see L. Sweeney, A Me­
taphysics of Authentic Existentialism (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1965; "Books on Demand"— Ann Arbor: University
Microfilms, 1977), Chs. 8-9, pp. 223-301.
3 In the sentence, "Forms make individuals be beautiful, just and 
tall," "make" is equivalent to "cause." Such statements as these 
are not unusual in everyday life and are readily understood: 
"Adding scotch rather than gin makes the drink be a Hob Boy rath­
er than a martini" or "his love of money makes him work night and 
day" or "The seamstress is making a dress from taffeta and the 
pattern she’s following makes it be a formal." In all such sen­
tences we easily recognize that "causes" can be substituted for 
"makes" without change of meaning.
In that respect the English word "makes" is similiar to poieo, 
which often express causality. For example, see Phaedo. 100D5f 
Theaetetus, 156A6-7, 160A1-2, 160C4, 182A5-6; Timaeus, 33A6,
37D5. For a different interpretation see G. Vlastos, Platonic 
Studies (Princeton: University Press, 1973), p. 90, n. 43; p7
937 n. 46.
♦ This second factor can also be referred to as "the participa­
tion" or "immanent form." "The participated perfection," used in 
the paper, should consistently be "the participated-in perfec­
tion" since the verb from which the participle comes is "to par­
ticipate in." But for convenience I shall drop the preposition 
in the participle. What is being expressed is clear: the per­
fection of the Form precisely as found in a participant, which it 
completes and perfects.
5* In what sense is a Form a "cause"? By "cause" (aitia) I mean: 
"that which produces something in some sort of direct fashion." 
One should keep in mind that cause is not equated with agent: an 
agent is a cause but so too, each in its own way, is a goal, an 
exemplar, a thing’s intrinsic constituents. A platonic Form, 
then, can be a cause without being an agent.
More precisely, what kind of cause is a Form? In the Timaeus
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(28A sqq., 30C sag., 51B sgq.) a Form will be seen to belong to 
the third sort of causalities just listed: it helps produce ex­
ist en ts as the exemplar or model which directs the craftsman's 
activity in fashioning them. In the Phaedo that dimension of 
causality is still latent. Yet even there it is authentically a 
cause because it helps produce existente by its being present to 
them and having perfection somehow in common with them. One 
might describe it as an "extrinsic formal" cause: extrinsic be­
cause it is not itself a part of the thing, formal insofar as by 
the very fact it is a Form it accounts for what a sensible thing 
is through participation.
* To make his point Plato here compares a Form with daylight and 
a sail--a comparison so crudely physical and so alien to his con­
ception of the Forms elsewhere as bodiless, transcendent, other 
than physical reality that obviously the comparison is only a 
technique to help his reader understand more authentically what 
Forms really are and how things and other Forms actually do par­
ticipate in them.
7 My argumentation is this: if είχάζω in the active means "I
make (something) an image of," then in the passive it can mean 
not only "something resembles another" (liddell-Scott, s.y.) but 
also "something is made an image of." If so> being-made-an-im- 
age-of can come about in two ways: both by the influence of the
Form as model and then it points to exemplary causality; second­
ly, by the influence of an agent, and then it designates effi­
cient causality. Granted that this unpacking of meaning from the 
passive voice may be more philosophical than philological and 
that it may be prompted by the information which the Sophist. Ti- 
maeus and Philebus give on exemplary causality of the Forms and 
the efficient causality of Mind. Nonetheless, it seems valid.
* While staging that battle Plato also makes the important point 
that being is the power to act or to be acted upon and, by infer­
ence, to cause or to be caused and to be participated in or to 
participate in (see 247D8-E4; 248B5-6). Being is, then, that by 
which the Forms can participate among themselves and that by 
which things can participate in Forms.
9 "What before was not comes now into being" might sound as
though divine causality were creative, but the Timaeus will show 
this not to be true: god, as well’as men, works upon already ex­
isting stuff: the chaotic primal bodies and their disorderly 
movements.
10 On univocal and analogous causes, see L. Sweeney, AMAE, pp. 
232-34.
11 On the other hand, the effect of an univocal cause working ac­
cording to its nature does not participate in its cause: the
offspring is sirailiar to his parents because both are human, but 
humanity in the offspring is essentially not less than but equal 
to that in the parents. Participation requires, then, that the
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effect be basically less perfect than its cause: the perfection
which they have in common is present in the effect in a limited 
and imperfect manner. As Aguinas points out: "est autem parti­
cipare guasi partem capere; et ideo guando aliguid particulariter 
recipit id gued ad alterum pertinet universalster dicitur parti­
cipare illud" (In librum Eoetii de Bebdomadibus Expositio 
[Harietti edition], II, 396-97J. For the full text plus commen­
tary, see I. Sweeney, "Existence/Essence in Thomas Aguinas· Early 
Writings," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical As­
sociation. 37 (1963), 120-21.
12 Without the mother’s wielding the brush, there would be no 
portrait, even though all the other factors might be present: 
the child posing, the canvas, the palette.
13 On direction, taken technically, see L. Sweeney, AMAE. pp.
295-300, especially p. 29S: The beautiful-as-known is a cause
because it helps produce ’»the agent’s activity by which he en­
deavors to project that exemplar into matter. But how does it 
produce that activity? By the direction it exerts upon the 
agent. This is not, however, to be understood in a physical 
sense (in which, for example, a jockey directs a horse race): it
is not an efficient cause. The beautixul-as-known sets the art­
ist into a state of absorbing, and ecstatic contemplation so that 
the ensuing efficiency by which he tries to externalize the con­
tents of that contemplation is itself colored, influenced, speci­
fied, and directed by that very contemplation.” Hence, one and 
the same set of activities is "simultaneously caused in a twofold 
way: exemplarily by the beautiful-as-contemplated, efficiently
by the agent through his operative powers and art habits. . . .
A single line of efficiency is both the direction which the beau- 
tiful-as-known exerts upon the artist and simultaneously the re­
sponse of the artist to the beautiful" and, in addition, the ef­
fect’s participation in the cause since no artistic activity can 
communicate the entire perfection of an exemplar. On the rela­
tionship between exemplarity and finality, see ibid.,, n. 91.
On creatures as co-workers with God, see L. Sweeney, ibid., 
pp. 235-39. All creatures are divine artifacts since God makes 
them all through knowledge. But many of them are also produced 
by other creatures, which can be called ’’secondary" causes (God 
is ’’primary” cause) and which produce them either naturally 
(e.g., parents generate offspring) or artistically (a sculptor 
carves a statue). God uses these secondary causes, whether act­
ing naturally or artistically, as instruments in his productivi­
ty-
15 At least physical agents were only "that without which the 
genuine cause would not be a cause" (Bhaedc. 99B)— see above, for 
the Greek text. Also see W. K. C-. Guthrie, BGP, IV, 349-52, 
where he speaks of such agents as "necessary conditions" and not 
causes (p. 350, n. 2). In Timaeus, 46C-E, physical factors are 
not the main causes (= final and exemplary) of things but merely 
"accessory causes" (synaitia) and a "lover of intelligence and
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knowledge Bust necessarily seek first for the causation that be­
longs to the intelligent nature.” See P. Friedländer, PI,ato.
Ill, 359-63.
18 For studies published between 1950 and 1957, see H. Cherniss, 
Lustrum. V (1961), 425-48: "Religion and Theology." See espe­
cially his consents on the following authors: D. Ross, #1491; A.
Dies, #1499; van Camp and Canart, #1502; Soleri, #1506, #1511, 
#1517; van Litsenberg, #1253. Even though this last author would 
like to identify Plato’s god with the idea of the Good and to 
pantelôs on. since they form the apex of Plato's system, he ad­
mits that Plato does not explicitly identify them. His final 
conclusion seems accurate: "The main questions concerning Pla­
to's theology do not as yet admit of any decisive answer. 
World-Soul and Demiurg are undoubtedly called God: this cannot
be said at all about the Idea of Good and the pantelôs on (God en 
het qoddeliike in de dialoqen van Plato" [Nijmegen/Utrecht: Dek-
ker Van de Vegt, 1955], p. 212). Also M. L. Lopez, El problema 
de Dios en Platon: La teología de Demiurgo (Salamanca: Consejo
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1963); C. J. de Vogel, 
"What Was God For Plato?" in Philosophia. I, 210-242; D. Roloff, 
Gott’ánlichkeit. Vergöttlichung und Erhöhung1 zu seligem Leben. 
Ontersuchunqen zur Herkunft der platonischen Angliechung an Gott 
(Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1970); J. B. Skemp, "Plato's Account of
Divinity," Durham 0niversify Journal. 29 (1967-68), 26-33; C. L. 
Stark, "The Idea of God in the Late Dialogues" (Doctoral Disser­
tation; Princeton University, 1970) .
17 Symposium. 210A-D and 211C, sketches the stages in that grow­
ing awareness of beauty in bodies, souls, laws and institutions, 
sciences.
18 See ibid.. 21QE-211B, where the realization is described as a
sudden and amazing vision of immutable, everlasting, transcen­
dent, subsistent, impassible Beauty, in which all comely things 
participate. In Phaedo. 76D-E, and Phaedrus. 247C-E and 249C, 
the awareness of Forms”comes to the soul prior to its entrance 
into the body, after which it depends upon recollection to renew 
its knowledge of the Forms. On recollection see N. Gulley, Pla- 
to's Theory, pp. 1-47, 108-120; on the Symposium see ibid., pp. 
49-537 "
19 See above, n. 5, last paragraph!
20 Their visible compounds (see 58C-61C) would, we infer, simil- 
iarly be images of Forms of compounds.
21 Thus a flame is not fire but fiery, and likewise with the oth­
er stuffs. Fire, air and water engage in a constant cycle of 
changing into one another (49A sgg.). Even though earth cannot 
be transformed into the other three or they into it (56D sgg.), 
still it is continuously undergoing changes on its own level 
through straining, drying, compressing, dissolving, compounding, 
etc. so as to form stone, earthware, soda, salt, glass and so on
15
(60B-61C). All four of the elements ceaselessly are caused to 
pass in and out of the receptacle, vhich thereby takes on their 
diverse appearances (50B5 sgg.).
22 On the Timaeus as prior to the Philebus (where attention is
paid to to apeiron as participant) and, even, to the Sophist, see 
Leonard Brandwood, “Analysing Plato's Style With an Electronic 
Computer," Bulletin of Institute of Classical Studies. 3 (1956), 
45-54; idem. "On a Discriminatory Problem Connected With the 
Works of Plato", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series 
B, 21 (1959), 195-200; idem. A Word Index to Plato (Leeds: W. S.
Haney, 1976), pp. xvii sg.
23 Besides "receptacle" (hypodoche). he also calls it "nurse" 
(titheng: 49A5-6). "pliable stuff" (ekmageion: 50C2), "mother" 
(50D2 and 51A4) and "space" (chora; 52A8).
2* Precosmic fire, air, etc., were "traces" and not authentic na­
tures (and, thereby, not yet images and participations) because 
presumably Plato conceived them after the fashion of Presocratic 
primal opposites, which had no cause and needed none. See G. R. 
Borrow, "Necessity and Persuasion in Plato's Timaeus." in H. E. 
Allen (ed. ), Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (New York: Humani- .
,ties Press, 1965), p. 426: the "traces" of fire, earth, air and
water in Timaeus, 48A, are "the primary bodies out of which Pla­
to's predecessors had constructed their worlds. . . .  Plato ac­
cepts them provisionally and attributes to them certain inherent 
gualities or powers, as his predecessors had done." Indeed, "to 
one who knows the speculations of Plato's predecessors, it is a 
familiar world that presents itself to the demiurge when he be­
gins his ordering activity." See also 1. Sweeney, Infinity in 
the Presocratics (The Hague: Hartinus Nijhoff, 1972), pp. 5 sgg.
25 since Plate does not explicate how precisely goals cause the 
cosmos, one must elaborate that causality from examples of human 
artistry. Take the case of Phidias' chiseling marble into a 
statue of Athena so as to make money. The profit is what he 
mainly wants from his activity, whereas his knowledge of Athena 
directs his artistry exemplarily. Goal and model are distinct. 
But let the case be that Phidias produces the statue because he 
is so inspired by love of the goddess as to wish to express his 
inspiration and love in stone. Then Athena would both cause his 
desire to produce her image and alsc direct that production. She 
would be both goal and model.
The situation regarding the craftsman's production of this 
cosmos matches this second instance. The Form of the Living Be­
ing is both goal and model. Its beauty and goodness so attract 
him that he wishes to reproduce its image, and it guides him as 
to what he makes: a visible All of living beings, which is as
beautiful and good as an image can be. On exemplarity and final­
ity, see L. Sweeney, ABAE, Ch. IX, pp. 253-301.
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